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Attorney Advertising In The Wake Of
FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc.: A
Groundbreaking Maintenance Of The Status
Quo*

I.

Introduction

Rosalie Osias is an attorney from Great Neck, New York who
specializes in the mortgage banking field. In an effort to tap into
the male-dominated industry, she produced a series of advertisements which showed her in revealing clothing and flirtatious
poses.' One advertisement showed Ms. Osias lying prone across
her desk with her heels in the air, with a question: "Does this law
firm have a reputation?" The answer: "You bet it does!!!" 2
The advertisements were successful. Before the advertisements
were run, Ms. Osias would represent clients at about five closings
per week; she now represents clients at about forty-five closings per
week, and has hired three new associates to her staff due to the
increased business.3 Nassau County Bar officials derided the
advertisements as "a disgrace that degrades the [legal] profession,"
and considered whether to commence grievance proceedings
against her.4 The bar association abandoned the idea.5
The issue of attorney advertising has been subject to intense
debate throughout the legal community and beyond, and has

* This Comment was submitted for membership in November 1995, and was selected
for publication in September 1996. A great deal of the author's analysis rests upon a survey
he conducted in September and October 1995. While the results may change if the survey
were conducted today, the author's analysis remains timely and original. -Ed.
1. Daniel Wise, Woman Lawyer's Suggestive Ads Stir Ire of Nassau County Bar, N.Y.
LAW J., Oct. 23, 1995, at 1.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Evelyn Nieves, Using a Feminine Edge to Open a Man's World, N.Y. TfMES, Nov.
28, 1995, at B6.
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sparked vocal disagreement about its propriety. Indeed, America's
foremost jurists disagree about the topic,6 and strong opinions
about attorney advertising are held by both powerful Congressional
leaders7 and ordinary citizens.' The integral question surrounding
the issue is this: if the public, and much of the legal profession,
finds certain advertising by attorneys distasteful and even offensive,
why not stop the advertisements? The immediate answer is that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution9 protect the rights of attorneys and others to engage
in "commercial speech."
An attorney's right to engage in commercial speech was tested
recently by the United States Supreme Court in Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc..l In that case, the Court, in a hotly contested
5-4 decision, upheld a Florida rule that prohibited attorneys from
sending targeted direct mail solicitation related to causes of action
for personal injury or wrongful death to accident victims or their
6. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy stated that attorney "communications
may be vital to the recipients' right to petition the courts for redress of grievances." Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2383 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Conversely, the late Chief Justice Warren E. Burger derided some attorneys who
advertise as "hucksters" and "shysters," and offered a simple "standard" for attorney
advertising: "Never, never, never engage the services of a lawyer who finds it necessary to
advertise in order to get clients." Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63
FORDHAM

L REV. 949 (1995).

7. One columnist reported some remarks by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich in
the wake of the verdict in OJ. Simpson's criminal trial:
'We must question the whole role of lawyers in society,' he said, and suggested a
ban on lawyer advertising. When it was pointed out that that violated free market
principles, not to mention the First Amendment, Gingrich stuttered and flubbed
for about two seconds and then argued, basically, that he didn't have to be
consistent. He was talking so fast there wasn't time to remind him that Johnnie
Cochran doesn't advertise.
Rob Morse, The Ceremony of Innocence, SAN FRAN. EXAMINER, Oct. 12, 1995, at A24.
8. A citizen in Florida, who received a letter from an attorney offering his services,
wrote: "I consider the unsolicited contact from you after my child's accident to be of the
rankest form of ambulance chasing and in incredibly poor taste ... I cannot begin to express
with my limited vocabulary the utter contempt in which I hold you and your kind." Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2378 (1995).
9. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press..." U.S. CoNST. amend I.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1.
10. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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The
families within thirty days of an accident or disaster."
Court's decision, which upheld a restriction on an attorney's right
to engage in non-misleading, truthful advertising, represented a
dramatic departure from a long line of cases upholding and
strengthening an attorney's right to engage in commercial speech.
The purpose of this Comment is to determine the extent to
which the Court's decision in Went For It will serve to prompt
future regulations on attorney advertising.12 Part II describes the
development and expansion of commercial speech rights for
attorneys. Part III discusses the factual background and Supreme
Court opinion in Went For It.
Part IV discusses attorney advertising in the wake of Went For
It and illustrates the dual quality of the decision. Part IV(A)
describes an informal survey of fifty-three state bar associations
conducted by the Author in an effort to determine the states'
reaction to Went For It. Part IV(B) argues that Went For It is a
truly remarkable and groundbreaking decision, and points to the
Court's apparent shift in course and to the reaction of several states
and courts.
Finally, Part IV(C) argues that despite the remarkable nature
of the Went For It decision, its impact should be the maintenance
of the status quo--that the decision will not serve to invite future
regulation of attorney advertising. Towards that end, this part will
argue that stare decisis, the importance of empirical data, and the
reaction of the majority of the states to Went For It demonstrates
that Went For It should not be seen as permission for states to
hastily regulate lawyer advertising.
II. Background: The Development Of Commercial Speech
Rights For Attorneys
A. Breaking New Ground: Virginia State Board
Before scrutinizing the FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc. decision
and its impact on the future of attorney advertising, it is important
first to trace the development of the body of First Amendment law
that guarantees an attorney the right to commercial speech. This
body of law spans almost twenty years.

11. Id. at 2375.
12. This Comment does not purport to discuss specific areas of attorney advertising or
to advocate a position on its desirability or professionalism.
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The United States Supreme Court first recognized First
Amendment protection of commercial speech in the seminal case
of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 3 In that case, the plaintiffs attacked on both First
and Fourteenth Amendment grounds a Virginia statute forbidding
the advertisement of prescription drug prices.14 The plaintiffs
were prescription drug consumers who claimed that they would
benefit from freely allowed advertising. 5
The Court, in a 6-3 opinion by Justice Blackmun, 6 held that
the advertising was protected as "commercial speech" by the First
Amendment, 7 and asserted that "speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project it...
even though it is carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit."' 8 The
important interest in the
Court also noted that society may have an
19
information."
commercial
of
"free flow
The Court then went on to discuss the State's interest in
promulgating the advertising ban. Justice Blackmun conceded that
the state may have an interest in "maintaining a high degree of
professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists."'' The Court,
however, argued that the ban on advertising did not affect the
desired result; rather, the close regulation of the profession in
The Court
general ensured standards of professionalism."
Virginia's
"highly
paternalistic
approach,"
stating
that if
rejected

13. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
14. Id. at 750.
15. Id. at 753.
16. Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart
each filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 748.

17. Id. at 762. The Court stated: "Our question is whether speech which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction,'. . . is so removed from any 'expositibn of ideas,'...
that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not." Id.
18. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 761.

19. Id. at 764. In a passage relevant to the continuing debate over advertising by
attorneys, Justice Blackmun noted that:
[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, and
at what price. So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions,
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial informationis indispensable.

Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 765.
21. Id. at 768-69.
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people are well informed they will make competent decisions
regarding their own self interests.22
In fashioning a middle-tier standard of review, the Court stated
that commercial speech may be subject to regulation by the
state.' The Court wrote that reasonable restrictions on the time,
place and manner of advertisements were within the state's
authority, but regulations must be "justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample24
alternative channels for communication of the information."
Finally, the majority noted that states are free to prohibit false and
misleading advertisements, as well as those which promote illegal
activities.' In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that commercial
speech, unlike political or ideological speech, is not the type of
speech that the framers of the First Amendment intended to
in the elevation of
protect, and expressed his disappointment
26
commercial speech to a protected level.
B. Commercial Speech Rights Pass to Attorneys: Bates
A year after Virginia State Board,the Supreme Court extended
First Amendment commercial speech protection to attorneys in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.27 In Bates, two attorneys who
opened a general practice clinic primarily for the benefit of lowincome clients placed newspaper advertisements indicating the
clinic's fee for certain standard legal procedures.' A complaint
was filed by the State Bar of Arizona, charging the attorneys with
violations of disciplinary rules prohibiting advertising by attor-

22. Id. at 770.
23. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 770.
24. Id.
25. ld.

26. Id.at 789-90. Justice Rehnquist argued that
[t]he Court insists that the rule it lays down is consistent even with the view that
the First Amendment is "primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy." ... I had understood this view relative to public
decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public issues, rather than the
decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind
of shampoo.
Id. at 787.
27. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
28. Id. at 354.
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neys.29 The Court invalidated the rule as a violation of an
attorney's First Amendment commercial speech rights.3 °
The State of Arizona's primary interest in enacting an
advertising ban was advertising's alleged adverse affect on professionalism. The State argued that advertising would cause commercialization, thereby "undermin[ing] the attorney's sense of dignity
and self worth."3 1

The Court disagreed, finding no causal link

between advertising and the decline of professionalism.3 2 The
Court also disputed Arizona's argument that advertising will
diminish the legal profession's reputation in the community.33
The Court then disagreed with Arizona's argument that
advertising by attorneys was inherently misleading,34 noting that
the argument "assumes that the public is not sophisticated enough
to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better
kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete
information."35 The Court also rejected Arizona's argument that
lawyer advertising would encourage more lawsuits and impair the
administration of justice, noting that advertising may actually be
beneficial to the administration of justice.36
The state's fourth argument in support of its regulation was
that advertising by attorneys would have unfortunate economic
consequences because the overhead costs of the legal profession
would be increased, and that such increased costs would be borne

29. Id. at 355.
30. Id. at 379.
31. Id.
32. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
33. Id. at 370. Indeed, the Court instead pointed to one of the putative benefits of
attorney advertising, stating that the public may hold attorneys in disregard because they do
not advertise, "while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic
associations so as to provide contacts with potential clients." Id. Along the same lines, the
Court indulged in a brief history of the legal profession and stated that "a ban on advertising
originated as a rule of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics." Id. at 371. Then the Court
stated that "habit and tradition are not in themselves an adequate answer to a constitutional
challenge." Id.
34. Id. at 372. Arizona argued that advertisements were inherently misleading because
(1) legal services are necessarily individualized; thus would-be clients cannot make informed
comparisons between their situations and those depicted in advertisements; (2) the would-be
client might not know in advance just what services he or she may need; and (3)
advertisements will emphasize irrelevant factors and ignore the lawyer's skill. Id.
35. Id. at 375.
36. Id. at 375-76. The Court argued that while lawyer advertising may add to the
number of cases filed, "we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action." Id.
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by the clients of those who advertise.37 In addition, the state
argued that such increased costs would serve to prevent young
attorneys from entering the market, thereby reinforcing the market
share of the established bar.3"
The Court rejected both of these arguments, noting that
competition in the marketplace may serve to lower the cost of legal
services.39 Furthermore, the Court found that in the absence of
advertising, attorneys must rely solely on their presence in the
community to generate clients-a position which inevitably favors
and sustains the position of the established bar.' The Court
further rejected the state's argument that advertising would
diminish the quality of legal services, declaring that "[a]n attorney
to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on
who is inclined
advertising.""4
Arizona finally argued that if advertisements were allowed, the
state would have considerable trouble protecting against abuses.
Arizona argued that "[b]ecause the public lacks sophistication in
legal matters, it may be particularly susceptible to misleading or
deceptive advertising by lawyers."42 The Court rejected this
argument as well, asserting that the high standards of the legal
profession will serve to "weed out" those attorneys who "abuse
their trust."'43

Notwithstanding its ruling, the Court pointed to the state's
right to place "reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of advertising,"' and reiterated that "[a]dvertising that is
false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint."45

37. Bates, 433 U.S. at 377.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.at 378.
41. Id. The Arizona Bar was concerned that advertising would cause lawyers to
advertise a "package" of legal services at a set price, thereby overlooking the individual
needs of individual clients. Id.
42. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
43. Id. Justice Blackmun noted:
It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the
virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert
that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort.... For every
attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will be thousands of others
who will be candid and honest and straightforward.
Id.
44. Id. at 383.
45. Id. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72.
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Furthermore, the Court hinted that states may require certain
safeguards to protect consumers, namely the use of a disclaimer or
some other form of supplementation.' Finally, the Court stressed
the role of the organized bar "in assuring that advertising by
attorneys flows both freely and cleanly."47
Chief Justice Burger delivered a forceful dissent in which he
argued that the changes in the practice of law spurred by the
Court's holding "will be injurious to those whom the ban on legal
advertising was designed to protect-the members of the general
public in need of legal services."' He also criticized the Court's
imposition of new regulatory burdens on state bar organizations.49
Finally, the Chief Justice conceded the need for public access to
information regarding lawyers, their services, and their fees, but
expressed his apprehension at allowing lawyers to advertise.50
Justice Rehnquist also dissented. He opined that the First
Amendment was not written to protect commercial speech at all,
let alone advertisements by attorneys.51 He stated that once the
Court started down a "slippery slope" in Virginia State Board, "the
possibility of understandable and workable differentiations between
protected speech and unprotected speech in the field of advertising
largely evaporated."52
C. The Expansion of Commercial Speech Rights of Attorneys
The eighteen years following the Court's decision in Bates have
seen a steady expansion in attorneys' rights to advertise in a
truthful and nonmisleading way. In In re Primus,53 the Court

46. Bates, 443 U.S. at 384.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 388. He wrote, "[t]he public needs protection from the unscrupulous or the
incompetent practitioner anxious to prey on the uninformed," and recommended that the
organized bar "experiment with and perfect programs which would announce to the public"
information regarding legal services and fees. Id.
51. Bates, 443 U.S. at 404. Justice Rehnquist wrote:

[T]he First Amendment speech provision, long regarded by this Court as a
sanctuary for expressions of public importance or intellectual interest, is demeaned
by invocation to protectadvertisements of goods and services. I would hold quite

simply that the appellants' advertisement, however truthful or reasonable it may
be, is not the sort or expression that the Amendment was adopted to protect.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 405.
53. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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applied a political speech analysis to hold that solicitation letters
sent by an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union were
protected by the First Amendment.-4 The attorney sent letters to
prospective clients regarding the forced sterilization of women in
conjunction with the Aiken County, South Carolina administration
of the federal Medicaid program."5 The Court noted that the
State may have an interest in protecting consumers from overreaching by attorneys, but rejected the application of prophylactic
rules to cure such ills.56
First Amendment protection was expanded in In re R.M.. 57
There, the Court held that an attorney who announced the opening
of his office by mailing announcement cards and placing advertisements inthe newspaper and yellow pages was protected by the
First Amendment.58 The attorney included information which was
not explicitly approved by the bar's rules; specifically, he described
his work as "personal injury" and "real estate" instead of "tort" or
"property," and included no disclaimer regarding certification of
expertise.59 Finally, the attorney stated, in capital letters, that he
was "[a]dmitted to practice before THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT."'
The unanimous Court held that the
advertisements were not misleading and that the State had failed
to prove a substantial state interest in proscribing his conduct.61
The Supreme Court, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,62 extended First
Amendment protection to an attorney's use of accurate illustrations', and held that Ohio's ban on self-recommendation and the
acceptance of business generated by unsolicited legal advice
violated the plaintiff's commercial speech rights.'
Attorney

54. Id. at 421.

55. Id. at 415.
56. Id. at 432. Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the state's prohibition on
lawyer contact with prospective clients was "entirely reasonable." Id. at 445 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
57. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
58. Id. at 207.
59. Id. at 196-97.
60. Id. at 197.
61. Id. at 205. The Court did say, however, that the lawyer's use of large capital letters
to indicate his admission to the bar of the United States Supreme Court was "at least bad
taste," but found nothing in the record to show that it was misleading. Id.
62. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
63. Id. at 647.
64. Id. at 639-41.
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Zauderer had placed advertisements in thirty-six Ohio newspapers
soliciting business from women who suffered from injuries resulting
from their use of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.65 The
advertisement contained an accurate drawing of the device with the
words "DID YOU USE THIS IUD?". 66
The Court held, however, that Ohio did not violate Zauderer's
commercial speech rights by requiring him to mention potential
plaintiff liability for court costs and expenses if he chose to mention
contingent fees.67 The Court distinguished the disclosure requirement from a prophylactic requirement by noting that the rule was
an attempt to get the attorney to convey more information than he
or she normally would.6 Additionally, the Court found that the
inclusion of69 such information was necessary to avoid misleading
consumers.
First Amendment protection was expanded further in Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of Illinois,' the
Court extended commercial speech protection to an attorney who
indicated on his letterhead that he was certified as a trial specialist
by the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA).7 1 The Court
concluded, contrary to the assertion of the bar, that the use of the
NBTA notation was not inherently misleading, because the
distinction between "licensed" and "certified" is "an obvious
one."72 The Court also dismissed the bar's argument that the
notation was at least potentially misleading, asserting that it was no
more misleading than the "[a]dmitted to Practice Before THE

65. Id. at 630.
66. Id.

67. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
68. Id. at 650.
69. Id. at 652-53. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, dissented in part with regard to the Court's holding that attorneys may obtain
clients through unsolicited legal advice. Id. at 673. She argued that such a practice is prone
to undue influence and overreaching:
Merchants in this country commonly offer free samples of their wares. Customers
who are pleased by the sample are likely to return to purchase more. This
effective marketing technique may be of little concern when applied to many
products, but it is troubling when the product being dispensed is professional
advice.
Id. at 673-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
71. Id. at 93.
72. Id. at 102-03. The court rejected "the paternalistic assumption that the recipients
of petitioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's
television." Id. at 105.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT" at issue in In re
R.M.J.73
On a related matter, in Ibanez v. Florida Department of
Business and ProfessionalRegulation, Board of Accountancy,74 the
Court held that an attorney who was a Certified Public Accountant
(CPA) and Certified Financial Planner (CFP) was protected by the
commercial speech doctrine when she used the CPA and CFP
designations on her law office letterhead.75 The Court noted76 that
both designations were entirely accurate and not misleading.
Finally, the Supreme Court held only once in the line of cases
preceding Went For It that the government's wholesale regulation
of attorney advertising passed First Amendment muster. In
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,77 the Court, via Justice
Powell, held that a state may prohibit direct, in-person solicitation
of clients by lawyers for pecuniary gain.78
The Court found that in-person solicitation was not entitled to
the same protection as other forms of advertisement because it
does not merely provide the recipient with information that he or
she may simply ignore. Rather, in-person solicitation is likely to
pressure the recipient because it often "demands an immediate
response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or
reflection. '79 The Court found that the state's interest in consumer protection was strong' and that rules proscribing such conduct
were necessary to "prevent[] harm before it occurs."'"

73. 1I at 106-07. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, dissented. She argued that the NBTA notation was inherently misleading because it
would lead readers to assume that Peel was better qualified to litigate than attorneys without
NBTA certification, and that such superiority was somehow licensed by the State. Id.at 12123 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994).
75. Id. at 2089-90. The Court's opinion was unanimous with respect to the CPA
designation. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented in part with
respect to the CFP designation. Id at 2032 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 2089-91.

77. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
78. Id. at 449.
79. I at 457. The Court noted that in-person solicitation offers a "one-sided"
presentation and encourages "speedy and perhaps uninformed decisionmaking." I&
80. i at 460.
81. Id. at 464. The Court also lamented some of the unsavory effects of in-person
solicitation: (1) recipients of the solicitation may become distressed by the obtrusiveness of
the attorney or the invasion of their privacy; and (2) unlike printed advertisements, in-person
solicitation is not "visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny," thus potential abuses by
attorneys may go unnoticed by bar officials. Id. at 465-66.
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Ever since Virginia State Board and Bates, the Court has
gradually expanded the scope of First Amendment protection for
lawyers who wish to advertise. This protection extends to direct
mail advertising, as illustrated by the following section.
D. Shapero and Direct Mail Advertising
Faced with facts similar to those in Went For It, the Court in
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association' extended First Amendment
protection to targeted direct mail solicitation that was neither false
nor misleading. 3 The Court, speaking through Justice Brennan,
held that because Attorney Shapero's letter was neither deceptive
nor false, his sending of targeted letters must be constitutionally
protected, as a similar newspaper advertisement would have been
under Zauderer.8 The Court found that the Kentucky Supreme
Court disapproved of the letter because it was targeted. To this the
Court retorted that "the First Amendment does not permit a ban
on certain speech merely because it is more efficient."'85 The
Court also rejected Kentucky's contention that targeted solicitation
would subject the reader to undue influence from a trained
advocate aware of the reader's situation. 6 It stated that the effect
on the reader is the same whether in letter form or newspaper
form.,,
Furthermore, the Court rejected the State's assertion that a
targeted letter somehow rises to the intrusiveness of the in-person
solicitation repudiated in Ohralik.88 The Court distinguished
targeted letters, and print advertisements generally, from in-person
solicitation by noting that unlike a personal contact situation, the
recipient of a letter can "effectively avoid bombardment of [his]
sensibilities by simply averting [his] eyes."89 Likewise, the Court

82. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).

83. Id. at 471. Kentucky had instituted a complete ban on direct mail advertising. I&l
at 468.
84. 1d at 473. The Court found that its cases had "never distinguished among various

modes of written advertising to the general public." Id.
85. Id. at 473.
86. Id. at 474.

87. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474.
88. Id at 475.
89. Id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465). This is the same argument proffered by the
Court in Zauderer. See Zauderer,471 U.S. at 642.
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asserted that a targeted letter invades the reader's privacy no more
than a letter mailed to the general public.'
The Court conceded that letters which are personalized,rather
than targeted,may increase the risks of deception. However, simply
because a form of advertisement may be abused does not justify a
prophylactic rule banning it.9 The Court related that the state
may regulate such abuses, and in fact may prevent them by
requiring attorneys to seek prior approval of a potential advertisement by State bar officials. 2 While acceding to the notion that
such a scheme may create more work for state bar officials, the
Court opined that "the free flow of commercial information is
valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators" the
burden of policing advertisements prevent misleading letters from
reaching would-be clients.93
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, dissented. Justice O'Connor criticized targeted
letters as inherently intrusive and misleading. 94 She then reviewed
the Court's initial decision in Bates, and asserted that Bates was
inconsistent with the test laid down in Central Hudson.9 5 Furthermore, her application of the Central Hudson test yielded a much
different result-that in fact Kentucky had a substantial interest in
"preventing the potentially misleading effects of targeted, directmail advertising as well as the corrosive effects that such advertising can have on appropriate professional standards." 96
In sum, Justice O'Connor's view was that the Bates experiment
had failed and that the issue of attorney advertising should be left
to the respective states.97 In so doing, she challenged the efficacy
of lawyer advertising in the first place and asserted that lawyer

90. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
91. Jd. (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
92. Id.
93. I& at 478.
94. Id. at 481-82. Justice O'Connor argued that targeted letters are misleading because
they (1) impose legal services on someone who has not sought them; (2) indicate that the
lawyer is familiar with the recipient's particular situation; and (3) are likely to contain advice

that, unlike general advertisements, is more geared to the lawyer's financial interests than
the client's legal needs. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

95. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 485-86. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
96. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 486.
97. Id. at 487.
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advertising is inconsistent with the ethical interests and goals of the
legal profession.98
E. The Central Hudson Test
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,99 the Court developed a four-part,
middle-tier scrutiny test for application in future commercial speech
cases. The litigation arose from the Public Service Commission's
banning New York electric utilities from using advertising that
The Supreme Court, per
encourages the use of electricity."
Justice Powell, held that the ban was unconstitutional. 101
The Court held that for regulation of non-misleading advertising to withstand constitutional attack, the state must prove both
a "substantial interest" and that the regulation is "designed
carefully to achieve the state's goal."'" From this, the Court
devised a four-part test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.103
Applying this test, the Court found that the First Amendment
did in fact apply and that the state's proffered interest was
substantial." 4 The Court also found a "direct link" between New
98. Id at 488-90. In Justice O'Connor's opinion,
fairly severe constraints on attorney advertising can continue to play an important
role in preserving the legal profession as a genuine profession ...this Court's
recent decisions reflect a myopic belief that 'consumers,' and thus our Nation, will
benefit from a constitutional theory that refuses to recognize either the essence of
professionalism or its fragile and necessary foundations.
Id. at 491.
99. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
100. ld at 558. The Commission determined that the use of promotional advertising was
"contrary to the national policy of conserving energy," yet admitted that the ban on
advertising "is not a perfect vehicle for conserving energy." Id at 559.
101. Id. at 561.
102. Id. at 563.
103. Id. at 566.
104. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568.
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York's interest and the ban on advertising. 05 The Court, however, found that the fourth prong of the test was not met. The
Court held that "[i]n the absence of a showing that more limited
speech regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the
complete suppression of Central Hudson's advertising.""
Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter.'°7 He assailed the
Court's test and argued that it elevates the protection of commercial speech too high-"to a level that is virtually indistinguishable
from that of noncommercial speech."'" Justice Rehnquist, who
had dissented in every prior case that held regulations unconstitutional, referred to his dissent in Virginia State Board. He said, "I
remain of the view that the Court unlocked a Pandora's Box when
it 'elevated' commercial speech to the level of traditional political
speech by according it First Amendment protection.""
E

Summary

The eighteen years following the Supreme Court's decision in
Bates have seen a gradual and consistent expansion of First
Amendment commercial speech rights for attorneys. On June 21,
1995, the Court handed down its decision in Went For It, holding
for the first time that the state may restrict truthful, nondeceptive
advertising. The following part describes the Court's opinion, and
subsequent sections will discuss its impact on the future regulation
of attorney advertising.
III. FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc
A. Background and Lower Court Rulings
Attorney G.Stewart McHenry brought suit in federal court on
behalf of himself and Went For It, Inc., a lawyer referral service he
owned, challenging the constitutionality of Florida Rules 4-7.4 and
4-7.8."o Rule 4-7.4 prohibited direct mail advertisements by
attorneys regarding personal injury or wrongful death legal services
within thirty days of the accident or disaster which created the need

105. Id. at 569.
106. Id.at 571.
107. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the judgment. Id.
108. Id. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

109. Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 598.
110. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1544-45 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
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for legal services."1 Rule 4-7.8 applied the same rule to attorney
referral services. 112 During the course of the litigation, McHenry
was disbarred; the entire case, however, did not become moot
because Rule 4-7.8
still prevented Went For It, Inc. from sending
3
targeted letters.1
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the Magistrate
Judge recommended an order in favor of the bar." 4 The district
court, however, disagreed and found that the thirty-day ban
violated the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the
115
United States Constitution.
The Florida Bar justified its rule by claiming that a potential
for abuse was inherent in direct solicitation of would-be clients by
lawyers, especially since the recipient of the letter is often in a
sensitive situation." 6 Thus the possibility of undue influence,
overreaching and intimidation was present. A thirty-day moratorium would serve to reduce such possibilities, and was justified
since other means of advertising remained available to the
attorney."7 The district court noted that the arguments proffered
by the Florida Bar were the same as those posited by the Kentucky
Bar and rejected by the Supreme Court in Shapero.118
The district court rejected the bar's assertion that sending a
letter was a direct interpersonal encounter, noting that "a letter,
unlike a 'badgering advocate,' can be avoided merely by placing it
in a drawer to be considered later, ignored or discarded.""' 9 In
addition, the court found that the bar's concerns over a lawyer's
deliberate overreaching were nullified by disciplinary rules already
in place." Thus, the state's proffered interests did not justify the
prophylactic rule.

111. Id. at 1544.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1545. Hence the use of "Went For It, Inc." in the caption to the Supreme
Court's decision. McHenry was disbarred for engaging in sexual misconduct in the presence
of clients. Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992).
114. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1544-45.
115. Id. at 1548.
116. Id. at 1545-46.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1546.
119. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1546 (citing Shapero 486 U.S. at 476-77).
120. Id. The rule mentioned by the court states that a lawyer shall not send a written
advertisement to someone if "[tlhe lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
physical, emotional, or mental state of the person makes it unlikely that the person would
exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer." Id. (citing Rule 4-7.4(b)(1)(f)).
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The court then rejected the bar's claim that the thirty-day
moratorium was a reasonable restriction on time, place or manner."' The bar analogized its rule to restrictions on political or
ideological speech upheld by the Supreme Court.1" The court
rejected these analogies because in those situations the recipient of
the speech could not avoid the speech merely by "averting [his or
her] eyes." 123 Furthermore, the court noted that, under existing
Florida rules, direct mail advertisements must be clearly marked in
red with the word "advertisement" on the envelope-thus the
recipient could discard it without even opening it.124
More significantly, the court rejected the rule as a valid time,
place, or manner restriction because the rule was not contentneutral."z The rule covered only personal injury and wrongful
death actions; indeed, the court noted that family members in a
wrongful death situation could be contacted within the thirty-day
period by probate attorneys 26 Because the court found the
restriction to be content-based, it did not consider the alternative
means of communication available to the lawyer.12
Finally, the district court concluded by hinting that it thought
the proffered advertisements served some useful purpose. It stated
that "[t]he challenged rules substantially impair and impede the
availability of truthful and relevant information which can make a
positive contribution to consumers in need of such legal services.' ' 128 It held, as a matter of law, that the rules were repugnant
to the Constitution; entitling Went For It, Inc. to summary judgment.129
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.' 3
It agreed with the district court's holding that the bar failed to

121. Id. at 1547.

122. Id. Specifically, the bar referred to three cases: Members of City Council of City
of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (prohibiting the posting of
election signs on public property); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (prohibiting the use
of sound trucks emitting loud noises); and Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (prohibiting
anti-abortion picketing outside private home). McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1547.
123. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1547 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
465 (1978)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1548.
129. Id.
130. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1039 (11th Cir. 1994).
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show substantial state interest or that the rule met that proffered
interest.131 In addition, the court also found that the rule was an
invalid time, place or manner restriction because it was not contentneutral.132
The court concluded by sympathizing with the bar and
expressing its disapproval of the type of advertising at issue. The
court, however, felt compelled by precedent to affirm the ruling of
the district court.133 The Florida Bar appealed
to the United
134
certiorari.
granted
which
Court,
Supreme
States
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
In a hotly contested 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit, holding that Florida's use of the thirty-day
moratorium did not violate the First Amendment commercial
speech doctrine. 135 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,136 analyzed the rule within the framework set forth in
CentralHudson.1 37

Considering the Florida Bar's proffered interest in protecting
the privacy and tranquility of the recipient of direct mail solicitation, and its appurtenant interest in preserving the reputation of
the legal profession, the majority held that "[w]e have little trouble
crediting the Bar's interest as substantial." 38 The Court found
the rule to be an effort to protect the waning reputation of the
legal profession in Florida "by preventing them from engaging in
conduct that, the Bar maintains, 'is universally
regarded as
' 139
deplorable and beneath common decency.'

131. Id. at 1043-44.
132. Id. at 1044-45.
133. Id. The court wrote:

We are forced to recognize that there are members of our profession who would
mail solicitation letters to persons in grief, and we find The Florida Bar's attempt
to regulate such intrusions entirely understandable. Although the Bar may not
formally restrict such behavior, an attorney's conscience, self-respect, and respect
for the profession should dictate self-restraint in this area. To preserve the law as
a learned profession demands as much.
Id.
134. 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
135. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995).
136. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Breyer. Id.
137. Id. at 2376.
138. IM.
139. Id.
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With respect to Central Hudson's requirement that the
regulation serve the government's interest in a "direct and material
way," the Court explained that the government's burden "is not
satisfied by mere speculation and conjecture; rather, a governmental body... must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them."'" Towards this
end, the Court found that the bar satisfied its burden with its twoyear study.'41
The Court observed that the anecdotal and statistical data
from the study showed that the Florida public saw direct mail
solicitation within the proscribed period as invasive of its privacy
and a poor reflection on the legal profession. 42 Citing the
record, the Court noted that fifty-four percent of those surveyed
indicated that the disputed communications were violations of
privacy. 43 Additionally, forty-five percent said that the solicitation's purpose was to capitalize on the gullible or sensitive.'"
The Court then related a series of anecdotal reactions to the
solicitations as evidence of public disapproval. 45 Based on the
evidence proffered by the bar, which was uncontradicted by Went
For It, Inc., the Court held that the bar had met its burden" of
proving that its interest was advanced by the regulation."4
The Court distinguished the Florida rule from the situation in
Shapero. Justice O'Connor noted that Shapero's treatment of the
privacy issue was casual-the Kentucky Bar asserted that its state
interest was in preventing attorney overreaching; whereas Florida's
interest was specifically found in the protection of the recipient's
privacy. 47 Furthermore, the direct mail ban of Shapero was a
broad ban on all direct mail, "whatever the time frame and
whoever the recipient," whereas Florida's moratorium was for a
limited duration and for the protection of a limited number of

140. Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2377 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585,
1588 (1995)).
141. Id. at 2377.
142. Id.
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2377-78. See supra note 8.
146. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2378. In so holding, Justice O'Connor responded to

Justice Kennedy's criticism of the accuracy of the Bar's study by noting that empirical
evidence need not be perfect to meet the Constitution's requirements. Id&
147. Id.
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potential recipients. 1" Finally, in Shapero the Kentucky Bar
offered no empirical data to prove its interest and the relation of
the regulation to that interest.'49
The Court argued that the harm that the regulation seeks to
eliminate "cannot be eliminated by a brief journey to the trash
can.'"" Rather, the thirty-day ban's purpose was to prevent "the
outrage and irritation with the state-licenses legal profession" that
is inherent in the receipt of a solicitation letter within such a short
time of an accident or disaster. 5 '
The Court then found that the requirement of CentralHudson
that regulations be no more extensive than necessary was satisfied.
The Court noted that the Constitution requires a "'fit' between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,"
and that the "fit" contemplated need not be a perfect fit to pass
constitutional muster. 52 The Court found the rule to be acceptable even though it applied to advertisements sent to those afflicted
with minor injuries who were not in a sensitized emotional
state. 53 The Court also asserted that, given the obvious harm
caused by the mailing of such letters, it saw no less-burdensome
alternative.1 The Court also noted that during the thirty-day
period, lawyers may avail themselves of a myriad of other advertising means. 155 Finally, the Court stated that, contrary to the
views of Justice Kennedy, the record indicated that individuals
would 6 have "little difficulty finding lawyers when they need
15
one."'
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, offered a strident dissent.5 7 In asserting that the
recipients of direct mail solicitations occasionally may benefit from
such communications, Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he Court
today undercuts this [commercial speech] guarantee in an important

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.

Id at 2379.
Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2379.
Id. at 2380. The Court noted that its characterization of the fit not needing to be

perfect did not constitute "the less rigorous obstacles of rational basis review." Id.
153. Id. In fact, the Court noted that a rule with an exception for those with minor
injuries would be difficult to construct. Id at 2380.
154. Id. at 2380.

155. Id. at 2380-81.
156. Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2381.
157. 1i at 2381.
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class of cases and unsettles leading First Amendment precedents,
at the expense of those victims most in need of legal assistance."1 8 He stated that vital speech and legal interests were at
stake in the thirty-day period covered by the bar's ban, because
during this period accident victims may be contacted by defense
attorneys or insurance personnel offering settlement. 159 Thus, he
argued it would be oversimplification to assume that direct mail
solicitation is commercial speech and nothing more' 6°
Justice Kennedy argued that Florida's purported state interests
in privacy and the legal profession failed to satisfy the requirements
of Central Hudson.61 He accused the majority of ignoring the
Court's holding in Shapero, which explicitly dealt with privacy
concerns and direct mail solicitation; there the Court determined
that direct mail solicitation does not produce the same privacy
intrusions as in-person solicitation. 62 Additionally, Shapero held
that the Court's inquiry should not be into the state of mind of the
recipient, but rather "whether the mode of communication poses
a serious danger."''
Next, the dissent rejected the majority's notion that a different
form of privacy concern was present here than in Shapero. Justice
Kennedy pointed to the Court's reliance on the sensitive state of
many recipients as justification for the privacy interest."6 He
repudiated this argument, noting that "we do not allow restrictions
on speech to be justified on the ground that the expression might
offend the listener."' 6 5 Furthermore, he added that recipients of
targeted direct mail are not a captive audience; thus "[a]ll the
recipient of objectionable mailings need do is to take 'the short,
though regular, journey from mail box to trash can.""'

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 2381 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 2382.
Id.
Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2382.

162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 474 (1988)).
164. Id. at 2282-83.
165. Id. at 2383. Justice Kennedy quoted from the Court's opinion in Zauderer
[T]he mere possibility that some members of the population might find advertising
... offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for

advertising that some members of the bar find beneath their dignity.
Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinaray Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 648 (1985)).

166. Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2383.
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Turning to Central Hudson's next requirement, Justice
Kennedy argued that even if the Florida Bar could show a
substantial state interest in privacy and the reputation of the
profession, the regulation fails because it does not advance that
interest "in a direct and material way."' 67 He attacked the bar's
study as flawed because the record of it before the Court "include[d] no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or
selection procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no
discussion of excluded results."'"
Finally, Justice Kennedy
contended that the Florida Bar's real concern was the reputation
of the legal profession and not the plight of accident victims. 69
Next, Justice Kennedy argued that the regulation fails the final
prong of the CentralHudson test because it is more restrictive than
necessary and not a "reasonable fit."' 70 Justice Kennedy contended that the rule deals with all victims of all injuries regardless of
their severity and assumes that no prospective clients desire contact
from an attorney.'71 He also asserted that where a situation
involves serious injury or death, it may be more imperative that
prompt legal representation be employed. 72
Justice Kennedy's final arguments regarding the reasonableness
of the ban centered around what he viewed as "commonsense
consideration[s]."' 73
He noted that the purported problem
surrounding direct mail solicitation was "self policing: [p]otential
clients will not hire lawyers who offend them."' 74 Additionally,
victims who are seriously injured and are "too ill-informed to know
that time is of the essence" may mistakenly enter into settlement
agreements before the thirty day period has expired. 75
Justice Kennedy concluded by lamenting the Court's retreat
from a long line of precedent in an effort to spare the legal

167. Id. at 2383-84.
168. Id. at 2384.
169. Id. He wrote: "Indeed, when asked at oral argument what a 'typical injured plaintiff
get[s] in the mail,' the Bar's lawyer replied: 'That's not in the record ... and I don't know
the answer to that question.' " Id.
170. Id. He argued that the rule "creates a flat ban that prohibits far more speech than
necessary to serve the purported state interest." Id.
171. Went ForIt, 115 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
172. Id. at 2385.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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profession of a bad reputation. 76 He observed that if indeed the
legal profession suffers from a bad reputation, that reputation can
be remedied only by improving the substance of legal practice."
Finally, Justice Kennedy accused the Court of complicity in the face
of censorship. 78
IV. The Dual Nature Of Went For It And Its Impact On
Attorney Advertising
A. The Survey
Because the Went For It decision is of recent vintage, it is
hardly surprising that there is a dearth of reported case law that
interprets its holding in the lawyer advertising context. In an effort
to determine whether Went For It would lead to more state
regulation of attorney advertising, the Author informally surveyed
fifty-three bar associations on October 22, 1995179 for their
reactions and future plans. Thirty-five jurisdictions responded,
yielding a return rate of approximately sixty-six percent."
The survey asked several broad questions: (1) whether the
jurisdiction had a rule similar to Florida Rule 4-7.4 on its books; (2)
whether, in light of Went For It, a similar rule will be proposed
and/or adopted; (3) whether, in light of Went For It, further
regulation of attorney advertising will be proposed and/or adopted;
(4) whether a recent study concerning public attitudes towards

176. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2386.
177. Id
178. Id Justice Kennedy wrote:

The Court's opinion reflects a new-found and illegitimate confidence that it, along
with the Supreme Court of Florida, knows what is best for the Bar and its clients.
Self-assurance has always been the hallmark of a censor. That is why under the
First Amendment the public, not the State, has the right and the power to decide
what ideas and information are deserving of their adherence.

Id.
179. All fifty states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the United States
Virgin Islands received the survey via facsimile.

Citations to the survey will be in the form of "Survey (state name(s))." See infra
Appendix A.
180. The Author is grateful to the bar associations of the following jurisdictions for their
generous participation in the survey: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,

Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
All responses remain on file with the Dickinson Law Review.
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attorney advertising had been conducted; and (5) whether a similar
study was planned in the near future. Generally speaking, of the
thirty-five jurisdictions which responded, sixteen-approximately
forty-six percent-indicated that future regulation was a possibility,
and nineteen-approximately fifty-four percent-indicated that the
status quo would prevail.1ts
B. Why Went For It Is Groundbreaking
There are several factors that illustrate the truly remarkable
nature of the Went For It decision. First and foremost, the Court's
decision itself represents a dramatic change. Went For It was the
first case since Virginia State Board, save Ohralik,1" to hold that
a given regulation did not violate the First Amendment."8
Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor,
persistent dissenters in the long line of cases prior to Went For It,
now constitute a majority, albeit a slim one. Their series of
dissents show their discomfort with First Amendment protection for
attorney advertising."
A second factor showing the remarkable nature of the Went
For It decision is the reaction of the legal community and several

181. Survey (all respondents).
182. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
183. Went For It is also significant because it was factually very similar to Shapero, yet
the Court reached an opposite conclusion without overruling Shapero. See supra notes 82-98
and accompanying text.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor's arguments in dissent in Shapero concerning the effect
of direct mail advertising on professional standards, Shapero, 486 U.S. at 490 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), carried the day in Went For It when the Court found that the Florida Bar had
a substantial state interest in preserving the reputation of the legal profession. Went For It,
115 S. Ct. at 2376.
184. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Virginia State Bd., see supra note 26; Bates, see
supra notes 51-52; In re Primus, see supra note 56; and Central Hudson, see supra notes 10709.
Justice O'Connor wrote dissents in Zauderer, see supra note 69; Peel, see supra note
73; and Shapero, see supra notes 94-98. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's belief that Bates was
wrongly decided and that attorney advertising is undesirable is evident in her dissent in a
recent case involving the in-person solicitation of clients by Certified Public Accountants.
She wrote:
I continue to believe that this Court took a wrong turn with Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona ... and that it compounded this error by finding increasingly unprofessional forms of attorney advertising to be protected speech .... In my view, the
States have the broader authority to prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not
directly harmful to the listener, is inconsistent with the speaker's membership in a
learnedprofession and therefore damaging to the profession and society at large
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 778 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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states to the decision. Opponents of the Florida Bar's regulation
decried the Court's decision as a "victory for the insurance
industry" and "judge-made PR." 181 Still others commented that
"states have been waiting for this decision to come down" and that
the decision could pave the way for future regulation)6
The reaction of State bar associations is further indication of
the significance of Went For It. Of the thirty-five jurisdictions
which responded to the Author's survey, sixteen indicated that
further regulations of attorney advertising may be pursued in light
of Went For It."8 Nine states indicated that they would pursue
rules similar to the Florida rule,1" while five others responded
that the possibility of proposing such a rule is currently under
consideration."l
The survey also revealed that eight states are considering
additional action beyond the waiting period rule in light of Went
For It. 1"
California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
South Carolina and Texas responded that the possibility of further
regulation is under consideration, but no specific proposals have
been formulated. 9 The State Bar of New Jersey reported that

185. Larry Smith, Supreme Court Flexes Censor's Muscle, OF COUNSEL, July 3, 1995, at
2-3. Additionally, Mr. Smith castigated Justice O'Connor's reference to the "outrage and
irritation" that recipients of direct mail feel by retorting that "[I]awyers, apparently, don't
have as much right to be outrageous and irritating in this democracy as, say, Nazi thugs."
Id at 2.
Beverly Pohl, an attorney who represented Went For It, Inc., stated that "[t]his is the
first time that the Court has decided a First Amendment question on the basis of public
opinion." Richard C. Reuben, FloridaBar's Ad Restriction Constitutional,A.B.A. J., Aug.
1995, at 20.
186. Reuben, supra note 185, at 20. Barry Richard, counsel for the Florida Bar, noted
that Went For It "makes clear that the authority of states to regulate in this area is not
limited to deceptive or misleading advertisements." Id.
187. Survey (Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas).
188. Survey (Alabama, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee).
189. Survey (California, Colorado, Indiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina).
190. Survey (California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Texas).
191. Survey (California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Texas).
Comments by State Bar of Texas President David J. Beck are noteworthy. In a
column he wrote: "[T]he State Bar has the green light to aggressively police barratry and
unauthorized solicitation through overly intrusive direct mail-and as a profession we must
do so." David J. Beck, Let's Clean Up Our Profession, TEx. BAR J., Oct. 1995, at 890.
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it signed an agreement with the American Red Cross-the first
such agreement in the nation-whereby both organizations would
join in providing information to victims of disasters, "including
cautions about avoiding unwanted solicitations from anyone [not
just attorneys] who might take advantage of their distress for their
This agreement grew out of the
own pecuniary advantage."'"
public's reaction to solicitations by attorneys of victims of the
recent pipeline explosion in Edison, New Jersey."'
Thus, the survey results demonstrate that states are considering
further restrictions on attorney advertising in light of the Court's
decision in Went For It. In this respect the Went For It decision
represents a remarkable change in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence, for the Court, at least at first glance,
has finally given its stamp of approval to the regulation of lawyer
advertising, something that states have sought ever since Virginia
State Board and Bates.
The remarkable nature of the Went For It decision is further
evidenced by its treatment in various courts since its issue. The
Fifth Circuit held that Texas' equivalent to the Florida rule, 94 in
light of Went For It, was constitutional. In Moore v. Morales,9 '
the court of appeals held that as applied to attorneys, "FloridaBar
controls."' 96
The Moore court found a substantial state interest in the
privacy of accident victims and their families, and found that the
statute substantially affected this interest.' 7 The court also noted
that the state met its burden of proof with evidence "of the great
number of complaints associated with direct mail solicitation in

192. Survey (New Jersey).
193. Id.

194. Texas' version of the Florida Bar rule is statutory. The Texas Penal Code declares
a person is guilty of barratry if the person (1) is an attorney, chiropractor, physician, surgeon,
or private investigator licensed in Texas, and (2) if written communication concerning an
action for personal injury or wrongful death is sent within thirty days of the accident or
disaster. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12 (West 1995). The statute further instructs that
violation of the rule is a felony of the second degree if the perpetrator had previously been
convicted of the same offense. Id.
For a discussion of similar rules in Nevada and New Mexico, see infra notes 238-47 and
accompanying text.
195. 63 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1995).
196. Id. at 361. During the course of the Went ForIt litigation, the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas found the statute to be unconstitutional. Moore v. Morales, 843
F. Supp 1124, 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
197. Moore, 63 F.3d at 362.

19971

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING

general," and testimony of expert witnesses on behalf of the state
that indicated the solicitations at issue were "detrimental to an
accident victim and his or her family."' 198 The court made this
finding despite the absence of even a perfunctory "study" similar
to that conducted by Florida. Thus, Moore may indicate a move
towards a greater acceptance of regulation of lawyer advertising.
A third and final factor illustrating the remarkable nature of
Went For It is the Court's interest in cases of this sort. One
commentator characterized the Court as having an "insatiable
appetite" for attorney advertising cases.19 To that extent, Went
For It should not be viewed as the last of a long line of cases, but
rather a harbinger of future litigation. Indeed, some commentators
are predicting that the Court will hear a case currently making its
way through the Florida federal court system." In Jacobs v. The
Florida Bar," the plaintiffs are challenging rules which prohibit
advertisements with testimonials, dramatizations, or illustrations.' ° Additionally, the plaintiffs are challenging a rule that
affects radio and television advertisements by mandating the use of
only one voice, allowing only background instrumental music, and
prohibits the use of a voice of anyone other than a full-time
employee of the firm whose services are being advertised.' The

198. Id. The court did not, however, mention any formal study conducted by the State
Bar of Texas. Instead, the court argued that Went ForIt"does not require an overwhelming
record in support of the 30-day ban." Id.
In related matters, the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas recently upheld
the majority of Texas' new advertising rules. In Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar
of Texas, 888 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Tex. 1995), the court upheld twelve rules aimed at
preventing misleading advertising. Id. at 1350-66.
The court, however, invalidated three rules: (1) a rule requiring the advertisement to
indicate the firm's principal office and prohibiting the mention of a branch office if that
office is not staffed at least three days per week; (2) a rule prohibiting the use of a statement
that the advertisement had received prior approval from the Bar, and (3) a rule prohibiting
the sending of written solicitations by registered mail. Id. The court's decision is on appeal
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Letter from David J. Beck, President, State Bar of
Texas, to Thomas J. Moore, the Dickinson Law Review (Nov. 2, 1995) (on file with the
Dickinson Law Review).
The Supreme Court of Florida, on July 20, 1995, adopted Rule 4-7.4(b)(2(C), which
prohibits the sending of written solicitations via "registered mail or other forms of restricted
delivery." See Florida Bar Re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 658 So.
2d 930, 943 (1995).
199. Smith, supra note 185, at 2.
200. Id.
201. 50 F.3d 901 (11th Cir. 1995).
202. Id. at 902.
203. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's
granting of summary judgment for the Bar, holding that the Bar
has the burden of proving its interest and justifying its restriction
on commercial speech.'
The preceding factors demonstrate that the Court's decision in
Went For It was truly notable and represents a shift in First
Amendment jurisprudence. But the dual nature of Went For It is
evident when one considers its practical implications. Simply put,
despite its groundbreaking nature, the reaction of states in favor of
future restrictions, and the validation of the thirty-day rule in
Texas, Went For It is best characterized as maintaining a tentative
status quo.
C. Went For It Should Not Alter the Status Quo
Despite the fact that Went For It may be viewed as an
invitation to do so, state bar associations should not hastily "jump
on the bandwagon" and enact further regulations of lawyer
advertising. Several factors support the conclusion that whatever
"floodgates" have been opened by Went For It should be closed.
1. Stare decisis.-The Went For It decision did not create a
new rule of law for commercial speech and attorney advertising
cases. The Court made its ruling specifically within the confines of
Central Hudson. 5 It did so despite Justice O'Connor's history
of dissent in such cases' and Chief Justice Rehnquist's disapproval of the Central Hudson test.7 Furthermore, in Went For
It the Court declined to revisit its holding in Bates2-which
granted attorneys commercial speech rights in the first
place-something the Florida Bar expressly asked it to do.'
This refusal again is telling given Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Shapero that the rule of Bates should be reviewed.21°

204. Id at 906. To date, no decisions have been reported after remand to the District
Court for the Northern District of Florida.
205. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Central Hudson.
206. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 27-52 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at *15, Florida Bar v. McHenry, No. 94-226,
1994 WL 614916 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1994).
210. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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The Court's rigid application of the Central Hudson test and
its refusal to reconsider its holding in Bates, despite the majority's
discomfort with both cases and their progeny, are testament to the
fact that Went For It is to be viewed strictly within the confines of
Central Hudson. That being said, Central Hudson imposes strict
limitations upon a state's ability to restrict attorney advertising.
2. Empirical data: Proving the state's case.-Although Went
For It upheld a rather narrow rule, states should not assume that
a similar rule, or any other rule for that matter, automatically
passes constitutional muster when applied to them. In order to
withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson, the state must prove its
interest and the means chosen to advance that interest.
The Court in Went For It found that the Florida Bar established its substantial interest, and showed that its rule advanced
that interest, by the findings of its two-year study.2 ' The Court
noted that a state's burden "is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a
restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms
it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to
a materialdegree."212
Thus, a state bar's opinion that certain forms of advertising are
distasteful and reflect poorly on the profession, or indeed the fact
that some members of the public find them distasteful, should not
by itself be viewed as justification for restricting an attorney's First
Amendment right to advertise. That is not to say that the state's
data or proof must be perfect; the Court in Went For It acknowledged that it need not.213 But states should not simply rely on
Florida's study as proof of its interest.214 Stated another way,
behavior that may invade the privacy of Floridians may not
necessarily invade the privacy of Iowans or Alaskans. Simply
because Floridians may have adequate access to attorneys, the same

211. Went For It, 115 S.Ct. at 2377.
212. Id., (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1995) (emphasis
added)).
213. Itt at 2377.
214. The Court in Went For It, however, did note that it had in the past allowed

"reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether." Went For It,
115 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-1 (1986)).
But "reference" and "reliance" are distinct notions. Regulators should be more circumspect

than to see the above statement as license to rely solely on Florida's efforts.
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may not be true in Vermont or North Dakota.211 With this in

mind, the Fifth Circuit wrongly decided Moore when it upheld
Texas' rule in the absence of any original data to support the
state's contention that the Central Hudson test was met.
The Virginia, Arkansas, and New York State Bar Associations
all share this view. The Virginia Bar not only revisited one of its
prior advisory rulings in light of Went For It, but acknowledged that
Went For It "reinforced the requirements under Central Hudson
that any regulation of truthful advertising must be shown to
advance a significant governmental interest.,

216

The Arkansas

Bar Association reported that it had a thirty-day rule petitioned for
consideration before the state supreme court, and after Went For
It was delivered, it withdrew its petition because it had neither
conducted a study nor otherwise produced evidence to justify the
rule.217
Likewise, the New York State Bar Association's Special
Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Referral Services specifically declined to propose a waiting period rule because "there is
no guaranty that New York, without a study similarto Florida'stwo
year study, could similarly demonstrate the interest and the nexus
between the regulation and the interest. "218 Furthermore, the
Committee's report also stated:
It is also questionable whether any other state, in enacting a
like regulation, could rely upon the Florida Bar's study to
support the finding of a substantial government interest. While
the decision does contain references to reliance upon a study
from a different locale, there was considerable discussion of the
breadth of the study conducted by the Florida Bar, which was
largely anecdotal. While there is nothing in particular that
linked the findings to any specific customs within Florida, the
215. H. Ritchey Hollenbaugh, chair of the American Bar Association's Commission on
Legal Advertising, stated this proposition. In warning that Went For It should not be read
to hold that a thirty-day rule is acceptable everywhere, he stated that states "will need to
provide evidence of some sort that direct-mail solicitation causes some harm in their state,
which is a state-by-state test." Richard C. Reuben, Florida Bar's Ad Restriction Constitutional, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 20.
216. Letter from James M. McCauley, Ethics Counsel, Virginia State Bar, to Thomas J.
Moore, the Dickinson Law Review (Oct. 27, 1995) (on file with the Dickinson Law Review)
(emphasis added).
217. Survey (Arkansas).
218. SPECIAL COMMrrIEE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND REFERRAL SERVICES, NEW

YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, Attorney Advertising Committee Report, Sept. 1995, at 41
(emphasis added) [NYSBA REPORT].
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reliance upon anecdotal information would be troublesome for
any other state to rely upon the Florida study.219

A state considering further regulation may use the results of the
Florida study to bolster its showing of a state interest. It should
not, however, rely solely on Florida's results to show its interest.
It must produce its own evidence.
Of the sixteen states that responded to the Author's survey
indicating that they plan to enact further restrictions on attorney
advertising, six indicated that they had not, nor were they sure that
they would, conduct a comprehensive study of the public's attitudes
concerning advertising.2' Six states responded that they had not
conducted a comprehensive study, but expected to do so in the
near future.22 1

Finally, four states responded that they had

conducted studies and either have obtained or are awaiting the
results.2'
The standards set forth in Central Hudson and Went For It
impose heavy burdens on a state wishing to restrict attorney
advertising. Thus, states should proceed with deliberate caution
before regulating advertising. In this sense, then, Went For It
cannot be seen as inviting further regulation.
3. Developments in the states.--Developments in various
states, and their reaction to Went For It, evince a climate of
maintaining the status quo with respect to attorney advertising,
despite state efforts to impose more regulation. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi recently held
that six new advertising rules violated an attorney's right to
The Court noted that the plaintiffs
commercial speech.2"

219. Id. at App. A, 2.
220. Survey (Alabama, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Texas).
221. Survey (Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Tennessee).
222. Survey (Florida, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and South Carolina).
223. Schwartz v. Welch, 890 F. Supp. 565, 576 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
The plaintiffs challenged rules which: (1) required the use of a disclaimer on all
advertisements; (2) required that an advertisement suggested an area of specialty it be
accompanied by a related disclaimer; (3) required disclosure of the advertising lawyer's
principal location of practice; (4) required disclosure that in contingency fee situations the
client may be responsible for expenses; (5) prohibited the statement that all attorneys in a
given firm were "juris doctors" without stating that the J.D. is not a medical degree and that
virtually all American lawyers are J.D.s; and (6) requiring disclosures such as "actor
portrayal" if the voice in the advertisement is not that of one affiliated with the advertiser.
Id. at 568.
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mounted "as-applied" challenge2 ' and declared the rules unconsti2
tutional because the Bar did not meet its burden of proof. 1

Likewise, the Oregon Court of Appeals recently invalidated a
statute which prohibited access to police records of automobile
accidents--otherwise public information-by individuals who
intended to use the information for commercial purposes by
contacting the persons involved. 2' The plaintiffs were lawyers
22
who sought the information to aid in soliciting legal business.
The court found that the restriction was content-based, and
therefore an unconstitutional time, place, or manner restriction
because it applied only to those who sought the information for
their own commercial use.2' Similarly, the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia recently applied the Central Hudson
an analogous rule, permanently enjoining its
test to invalidate
229
enforcement.
The premise that the status quo should prevail is borne out by
the results of the Author's informal survey. Of the thirty-five
jurisdictions that responded to the Author's survey, nineteen
responded that, in the wake of Went For It, they had no plans to
pursue either rules similar to Florida's thirty day rule or other
Michigan indicated that it
restrictions on attorney advertising.'
was "studying" whether to pursue any rule changes. 21
Washington responded that it had declined to propose a waiting
period rule in 1993 and was unsure whether it would propose that
rule or others again. 2 Additionally, Oregon responded that a
224. The court found that the plaintiffs mounted an "as-applied" challenge because, but
for the prohibitions, they would advertise in the manner proscribed by the rules. Id. at 570.
Alternatively, a "facial challenge" is one in which a plaintiff has not violated the rule, nor
are there any circumstances which may test the rule. Id.
The distinction is important because a plaintiff mounting a facial challenge bears the
burden of proving that the rule is unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 570, n.11. Conversely,
in an as-applied challenge, "[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech
carries the burden of justifying it." Id. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 71, n.20 (1983)).

225. Id. at 576.
226. Zackheim v. Forbes, 895 P.2d 793 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
227. Id. at 794-95.
228. Id. at 795-97.
229. Speer v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
230. Survey (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia). See also NYSBA REPORT.

231. Survey (Michigan).
232. Survey (Washington).
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temporal ban had been proposed and defeated in the past, and that
there was no attempt to impose a waiting period when the state's
disciplinary rules were amended in 1993.13
The response of the majority of the states to the Author's
survey that they would not, in light of Went For It, further pursue
regulation is testimony to the notion that Went For It is a very
narrow holding and not likely to spur widespread regulation.'
In addition, the responses of those who indicated plans to enact
regulations in light of Went For It is telling. Of those sixteen
respondents, fourteen indicated that they may pursue waiting
period rules,"3 while only eight indicated present or potential
plans for additional restrictions. 6 This disparity suggests that, to
the extent that Went For It leads to more regulation at all, such
regulation should be narrowly crafted-limited in large part to the
type upheld in Went For It. In this context, Went ForIt can hardly
be construed as inviting scores of further regulations.
4. Construingrules in light of Went For It.-Nevada Supreme
Court Rule of Professional Conduct 197(4) states that
[w]ritten communication directed to a specific prospective client
who may need legal services due to a particular transaction or
occurrence is prohibited in Nevada within 45 days of the
transaction or occurrence giving rise to the communication. 7
The rule is noteworthy because it makes no reference to personal
injury or wrongful death cases. Thus it would appear that the rule
applies to all attorneys in all situations."
Given the Went For It majority's argument that Florida's
thirty-day ban was of only a limited duration, coupled with its
observation that during this period the attorney may take advantage of alternative means of advertising, 9 Nevada's rule should
withstand scrutiny under Went ForIt. This is especially likely since
the rule appears to apply to all lawyers, not simply tort lawyers,
233. Survey (Oregon).
234. The Virginia, Arkansas, and New York Bar Associations all indicated that they
would not pursue further regulation in light of Went For It. For a discussion of their
responses, see supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
237. NEv. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 197(4) (Michie, 1995).
238. To date, no decision has been reported which rules on the constitutionality of the
rule or defines its parameters.
239. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
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thus eliminating any argument that the rule is content-based.2 °
The assertion of the constitutionality of Nevada's rule under
Central Hudson and Went For It, of course, presupposes that the
Nevada Bar could effectively demonstrate a substantial state
interest and that the rule is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
New Mexico's version of the Florida rule is unique. Rule 16701(C)(4) simply imposes a complete ban on direct mail solicitation
if it "concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death.""24
The comment by the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association states
that such solicitation "impedes, rather than encourages, the
'
informed selection of attorneys."242
The NMTLA Comment further posits that the rule is not in
conflict with Shapero, because it does not apply to all attorneys;
only personal injury and wrongful death cases "where legitimate
'
government interests are at stake."243
The NMTLA Comment
finally argues that the rules serves the substantial state interest of
the "protection of the public to select their attorneys free of
duress," and that the rule is specifically tailored to meet that
interest because a complete ban is the only reasonable method of
achieving the state's interest.2 "
If challenged, this rule should be deemed unconstitutional. It
is a complete ban on only personal injury and wrongful death
lawyers. Thus, while distinguishable from Shapero, it is in conflict
with Went For It, which (1) specifically noted the lack of "less
burdensome alternatives" to Florida's "short temporal ban of only
thirty days," and (2) hinted that the Florida rule might have been
unconstitutional "if the Bar's rule were not limited to a brief
'
period."24
Here, personal injury lawyers may never solicit clients
by letter. Thus, the rule is also content-based, and therefore is an
unreasonable time, place or manner restriction.2' To date, no

240. See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (restrictions on time, place and manner are acceptable
"provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.").
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

N.M. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16-701(C)(4) (Michie, 1995 Supp.).
Id. Cmt.
Id.
Id.
Went ForIt, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.

246. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 (restrictions on time, place and manner
are acceptable "provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.").
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case has been reported that rules on the constitutionality of this
rule.
5. Summary.-While the Went For It result is at first blush a
groundbreaking decision, as a practical matter it does not alter the
status quo concerning regulation of attorney advertising. If
anything, it increases the regulator's burden because in Went For
It Florida's interest and means were substantiated by empirical
data. Thus, in order to implement future regulations, states must
have tangible evidence that there is a substantial state interest and
narrowly tailored means.
In addition, the Supreme Court's adherence to precedent and
its refusal to revisit Bates demonstrate that its holding is narrow
indeed. Likewise, the reaction of the states to Went For It
illustrates that, at most, some states may attempt to implement a
waiting period similar to Florida's, but the majority of states do not
see Went For It as an invitation to implement further regulation.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc. was groundbreaking because it was the first in a long line of
cases since Bates in which the Court upheld a restriction on
truthful, non-misleading advertising by attorneys. The decision is
also significant because it has led several states to consider enacting
further regulations on advertising.
Despite these novel effects, however, Went For It should not
be read as an invitation to states to hastily regulate forms of
advertising it finds distasteful or beneath the dignity of the legal
profession. For regulation to pass constitutional muster, it must
meet the stringent requirements of Central Hudson, which have
been strengthened by the Went For It majority's reliance empirical
data.
States seeking to regulate attorney advertising should read
Went For It as evincing the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold
regulations of commercial speech, but only if the state can prove a
substantial interest and narrowly tailored means with solid
evidence. An alternative reading invites not only litigation but the
risk of having the regulation deemed unconstitutional. Thus, states
should proceed with deliberate caution and careful study.
Went For It has certainly clouded the parameters of what
constitutes acceptable regulation of attorney advertising. Just
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where those parameters are currently located and where they may
wind up is open to debate. It is a certainty, however, that the
organized bar's efforts to rein in what it considers distasteful and
unprofessional advertising will result in further litigation before the
Supreme Court. Only then will we know for sure the greater
impact of Went For It. And until then, Went For It will serve to
maintain the status quo.
Thomas Jon Moore

1997]

ATYORNEY ADVERTISING

Appendix A
QUESTIONAIRE

1.

Does your jurisdiction currently have a rule prohibiting
direct mail solicitation by attorneys within a specified time
after an accident or some other event?
Yes

No

If no, has/will your jurisdiction take action to implement
such a rule?
2.

In light of Florida Bar v. Went For It, has your jurisdiction
implemented (or do you expect your jurisdiction to implement)
further regulations concerning attorney advertising?
Yes

_

No

If yes, please briefly describe those regulations

3.

Has your jurisdiction recently conducted any studies
concerning the public's attitudes towards attorney advertising?
Yes

No

If yes, please briefly describe the results of any studies

If no, do you expect to conduct a survey sometime in the
near future?
Yes

No
Thank you for your participationin this survey!

